Restructuring Business Transactions for Federal Income Tax Purposes by Bittker, Boris I & Menikoff, Jerry
RESTRUCTURING BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS FOR




A common phenomenon in the federal income tax field is the
"restructured transaction"-a business arrangement that is classified
differently by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts than by
the private parties who entered into it. For example, an owner of
business equipment may agree to lease it for an extended period with
an option to purchase, on terms virtually insuring that the lessee will
exercise the option because the aggregate rent to be paid equals the
value of the property (plus an allowance to reflect the fact that pay-
ments are to be made over a period of years) and the option price is
minimal. If the transaction is treated as the implementing documents
provide and the parties intend, the owner reports gain or loss only if
and when the option is exercised, and can deduct depreciation on the
property in the interim. Conversely, the lessee can deduct the rent as
a business expense as paid or accrued, and can depreciate the prop-
erty only on becoming its owner by exercising the option.
But if the lease is found by the IRS and courts to be the func-
tional equivalent of a sale of the property, the tax results are quite
different. Viewed as a vendor of the equipment, the "lessor" must
compute gain or loss when the "lease" is executed, and the subse-
quently received "rent" must be divided between nontaxable princi-
pal payments and taxable interest.' The "lessee," for its part,
becomes the owner of the property for tax purposes from the date of
the lease, is entitled to an investment credit if the property qualifies
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for that allowance, can depreciate the property over its estimated
useful life, and must divide the "rent" between nondeductible capital
outlays and deductible interest.
It necessarily follows that questions about the proper classifica-
tion of a business transaction can arise in connection with almost
any tax allowance. An issue may lie dormant for years, but spring to
life when a particularly alert taxpayer or revenue agent perceives
that the events, if reclassified, would have a different set of tax conse-
quences. Whenever the issue arises, however, the ingredients deter-
mining whether a transaction should be accepted at face value or
restructured are usually the same.2
The restructuring of a transaction usually raises important
threshold issues of a procedural nature. Can the IRS hold the parties
to the label that they selected if it so desires, or can taxpayers take
the initiative in repudiating their own formal representations? 3 Does
the parol evidence rule prohibit the IRS or a party from introducing
evidence of negotiations or prior understandings between the parties
that are not reflected in the final written agreement?4 If the IRS is
successful in restructuring the transaction as to one taxpayer, must it
act consistently vis-a-vis the other party or parties to the same ar-
rangement? 5 If consistency is desirable or mandatory, how can it be
assured, given the decentralized judicial review that regults from the
concurrent existence of a single United States Tax Court, hundreds
of district courts, and eleven courts of appeals? 6 Like the basic issue
of reclassification, these procedural issues can arise when any of doz-
ens of tax allowances are at stake.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that "restructuring" is too
grandiose a term for the judicial process described below, if it im-
plies that the legal relationships between the parties to the transac-
tion are changed by its altered tax aspects. In point of fact, of course,
the parties continue to be bound by the contract as written, which
determines where legal ownership resides, what payments must be
made and when, and the parties' other nontax rights and du-
ties-unless, as sometimes occurs, a parallel restructuring occurs
under local law in determining, for example, the applicability of
usury, recordation, or regulatory laws.7 For these reasons, the term
"reclassification" is sometimes used to indicate that the transaction's
2. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1291 (1978) (refusing to restruc-
ture sale-leaseback transaction as mortgage).
3. See text accompanying notes 38-44 infra.
- 4. See text accompanying notes 29-37 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 45-50 infra.
6. Id
7. See generally EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING (Fritch & Reisman eds.,
PLI, 1977) (discussing the numerous nontax ramifications of a restructured leveraged lease)
[hereinafter cited as Fritch & Reisman].
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tax consequences are different from those ordinarily suggested by its
label. But if "restructuring" is too grandiose a term, "reclassifica-
tion" may be too modest, since it may be understood as implying no
more than a change of labels. As pointed out above, whether the
transaction is "restructured," "reclassified," "recast," or "realigned,"
the result is a completely different set of tax results from those that
the parties bargained for.
I. SALE VS. LEASE
Although most leases contemplate that the occupant will use the
property for a limited period of time and then surrender possession
to the owner, business taxpayers frequently enter into leases that in-
clude an option to the lessee to purchase the property or that vest
ownership in the lessee when a specified number of periodic pay-
ments have been made. Commenting on such an agreement, the Tax
Court has observed: "Cases like this, where payments at the time
they are made have dual potentialities, i.e., they may turn out to be
payments of purchase price or rent for the use of property, have al-
ways been difficult to catalogue for income tax purposes."'8
In Starr's Estate v. Commissioner,9 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit attributed the popularity of borderline arrangements
bearing the label "lease" to tax considerations:
Yesterday's equities in personal property seem to have be-
come today's leases. This has been generated not a little by the
circumstance that one who leases as a lessee usually has less
trouble with the federal tax collector. At least taxpayers think so.
But the lease still can go too far and get one into tax trouble.
While according to state law the instrument will probably be
taken (with the consequent legal incidents) by the name the par-
ties give it, the internal revenue service is not always bound and
can often recast it according to what the service may consider the
practical realities. 10
If the lessee is required to pay more than the fair rental value of
8. Chicago Stoker Corp. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 441, 444 (1950) (payments held to be
nondeductible installments of purchase price rather than deductible rent). See also Kitchin v.
Commissioner, 353 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1965) (rejecting the alternative of holding the transaction
open until the lessee either exercised the option to purchase the property or allowed it to ex-
pire).
For a general discussion and a review of the early cases, see Blumenthal and Harrison,
The Tax Treatment of the Lease With an Option to Purchase, 32 TEX. L. REV. 839 (1954).
9. 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) (purported lease of automatic sprinkler system treated as
sale).
10. Id at 294-95. See also Rev. Rul. 57-371, 1957-2 C.B. 214. On occasion, however,
taxpayers prefer to have a borderline transaction treated as a sale. See, e.g., Meiselman v.
Commissioner, 300 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1962); Robertson v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 534 (1930)
(lease-option restructured as sale at taxpayer's instance, although lease-option form was cho-
sen to avoid state redemption laws in favor of buyers in possession).
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the property, and is compensated for this burden by a low option
price, he will lose the benefit of the excess rental payments unless he
exercises the option; for practical purposes, therefore, the excess rent
builds up an equity in the property."' As a result, the lessee's eco-
nomic position resembles that of a purchaser of property who makes
a large downpayment and finances the balance with a nonrecourse
mortgage. Like the purchaser's freedom to default on the mortgage,
the lessee's freedom to let the option expire without exercise is illu-
sory in view of the resulting loss of his potential equity. This analysis
is, of course, based on a prediction of future behavior; if the value of
the property should in actuality drop below the option price, the
lessee will not exercise the option, but it is equally true that a pur-
chaser-mortgagor will not pay off a nonrecourse mortgage if the
value of the property drops below the balance due.
By contrast, if the rent reserved in a lease does not exceed the
fair rental value of the property, any option that is vested in the
lessee will usually require payment of the anticipated value of the
property at exercise. In this situation, the rent paid by the lessee does
not build up an equity, and, when the lease is executed, there is no
reason to expect the lessee to exercise the option rather than to let it
expire. Conversely, the lessor cannot expect to be better off if the
lease option expires, permitting him to offer the property on the mar-
ket, than if the lessee decides to exercise it. For these reasons, a lease
of this type should be treated as such; the lessee becomes a purchaser
only if and when the option is exercised.
In an extended ruling outlining the principal contractual ar-
rangements that raise classification problems, the IRS summarized
its view of the governing principles as follows:
4.01. Whatever interest is obtained by a lessee is acquired
under the terms of the agreement itself. Whether an agreement,
which in form is a lease, is in substance a conditional sales con-
tract depends upon the intent of the parties as evidenced by the
provisions of the agreement, read in the light of the facts and cir-
cumstances existing at the time the agreement was executed. In
ascertaining such intent no single test, or any special combination
of tests, is absolutely determinative. . . . However, from the deci-
sions cited . . . , it would appear that in the absence of compel-
ling persuasive factors of contrary implication an intent
warranting treatment of a transaction for tax purposes as a
purchase and sale rather than as a lease or rental agreement may
in general be said to exist if, for example, one or more of the fol-
lowing conditions are present:
(a) Portions of the periodic payments are made specifi-
cally applicable to an equity to be acquired by the lessee
I1. See note I supra.
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(b) The lessee will acquire title upon the payment of a
stated amount of "rentals" which under the contract he is re-
quired to make ....
(c) The total amount which the lessee is required to pay
for a relatively short period of use constitutes an inordinately
large proportion of the total sum required to be paid to secure
the transfer of the title ....
(d) The agreed "rental" payments materially exceed
the current fair rental value. This may be indicative that the
payments include an element other than compensation for
the use of property ....
(e) The property may be acquired under a purchase op-
tion at a price which is nominal in relation to the value of the
property at the time when the option may be exercised, as
determined at the time ,of entering into the original agree-
ment, or which is a relatively small amount when compared
with the total payments which are required to be made ....
(f) Some portion of the periodic payments is specifi-
cally designated as interest or is otherwise readily recogniza-
ble as the equivalent of interest ....
4.02. The fact that the agreement makes no provision for
the transfer of title or specifically precludes the transfer of title
does not, of itself, prevent the contract from being held to be a sale
of an equitable interest in the property.
4.03. Conditional sales of personal property are, in general,
recordable under the various State recording acts if the vendor
wishes to protect its lien against claims of creditors. However, the
recording or failure to record such a sales contract is usually dis-
cretionary with the vendor and is not controlling insofar as the
essential nature of the contract is concerned for Federal tax pur-
poses. '
2
12. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, 41-42 (citations omitted). For illustrations of the
principles enunciated by Rev. Rul. 55-540, see M. & W. Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d
841 (7th Cir. 1971) (combination of high "rent" and low option price, compared with value of
property, supports Tax Court' conclusion that purported lease with option to purchase was a
sale); Universal Drilling Co. v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. La. 1976) (concluding
that guidelines of Rev. Rul. 55-540 "are consistent with the jurisprudence" and that ship char-
ter was lease rather than sale). See also Rev. Rul. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19 (lease of office equip-
ment requiring very high rental payments during first 3 years and low payments during
subsequent 10 years for use of equipment with estimated useful lifeof 10-15 years, treated as
sale); Rev. Rul. 55-542, 1955-2 C.B. 59 (similar arrangement, under which title will pass to
lessee at end of rental period upon payment of then depreciated value of the equipment,
treated as sale); Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960-1 C.B. 56 (contrasting two "leases" of business equip-
ment by reference to the relationship between the term of the contract and the anticipated
useful life of the property).
In Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955), a leading case decided in
the same year Rev. Rul. 55-540 was promulgated, the court was concerned with the correlative
tax results for both parties to a purported lease:
Looking at this transaction from a long range view we find that if the opinion of
the Tax Court is affirmed, Wilshire Holding Corporation, at the expiration of the
1978:715
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After setting out these general principles, Revenue Ruling 55-
540 goes on to apply them to the following recurring factual patterns:
4.04. Agreements are usually indicative of an intent to rent
the equipment if the rental payments are at an hourly, daily, or
weekly rate, or are based on production, use, mileage, or a similar
measure and are not directly related to the normal purchase price,
provided, if there is an option to purchase, that the price at which
the equipment may be acquired reasonably approximates the an-
ticipated fair market value on the option date ....
4.05. In the absence of compelling factors indicating a dif-
ferent intent it will be presumed that a conditional sales contract
was intended if the total of the rental payments and any option
price payable in addition thereto approximates the price at which
the equipment could have been acquired by purchase at the time
of entering into the agreement, plus interest and/or carrying
charges ....
4.06. If the sum of the specified "rentals" over a relatively
short part of the expected useful life of the equipment approxi-
mates the price at which the equipment could have been acquired
by purchase at the time of entering into the agreement, plus inter-
est and/or carrying charges on such amount, and the lessee may
continue to use the equipment for an additional period or periods
approximating its remaining estimated useful life for relatively
nominal or token payments, it may be assumed that the parties
have entered into a sale contract, even though a passage of title is
not expressly provided in the agreement. 13
Revenue Ruling 55-540 is more than 2 decades old and many
cases have been decided since it was promulgated, but it remains a
useful guide for planning purposes. Some courts have preferred to
search for the "intent" of the parties rather than employ the eco-
nomic test espoused by the IRS, but their objection seems confined
to Rev. Rul. 55-540's arithmetic ratios, rather than to its list of rele-
vant factors, which was distilled from prior case law rather than in-
vented by an imaginative revenue agent.' 4 Moreover, although Rev.
"lease," will have acquired a very valuable piece of property for payments written off
entirely as business expense while petitioner will have, in effect, sold a valuable piece of
property without having been able to treat the proceeds as a long term capital gain.
Id at 803. On examination, the court concluded that the transaction was tantamount to a sale,
and should be so treated for tax purposes. In a companion case, the court mandated consistent
treatment for the purported lessor. See Commissioner v. Wilshire Holding Corp., 244 F.2d 904
(9th Cir. 1957).
13. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B., at 42-43.
14. See, e.g., Cubic Corp. v. United States, 34 A.F.T.R.2d 5895 (S.D. Cal. 1974), aft'dper
curiam, 541 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976) (taxpayer tried unsuccessfully to invoke Rev. Rul. 55-540,
described by the court as entailing "a hindsight attempt to distill the intent of the parties by
means of a narrow and restrictive test"); Meiselman v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 666, 668 (4th
Cir. 1962) (if facts show that a sale was "the real intent of the parties ... then the transaction
should be so categorized for tax purposes"). See also Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745,
752 (5th Cir. 1952) (predating Rev. Rul. 55-540 "good faith intent" controlling, rather than
objective economic test).
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Rul. 55-540 focused on leases executed in the ordinary course of
business between tax-conscious manufacturers or dealers and their
customers, its criteria are also applied to amateurs engaged in a one-
shot transaction.1
5
The cases and rulings involving the sale-lease distinction that
are discussed above arose out of two-party transactions, in which an
owner of business equipment made it available to a user in return for
periodic payments. In effect, the owner (whether ultimately found to
be a seller or a lessor) financed the transaction by agreeing to be
compensated over a period of time rather than when the contract
was executed. If the owner is unable or unwilling to provide the
necessary financing, the parties may turn to a third party as a source
of capital. If they employ a conventional sale by the manufacturer or
dealer to the customer, coupled with a normal mortgage loan by a
bank or financial institution to the customer, the transaction's
classification for federal income tax purposes will almost always cor-
respond to its formal trappings.
In recent years, however, three-party equipment leases have
come to the fore as competitors of conventional mortgages, particu-
larly when the user does not want to carry a mortgage debt on its
balance sheet' 6 or is prevented from borrowing by agreements with
prior creditors or when tax allowances associated with ownership of
the property (e.g., the investment credit and accelerated deprecia-
tion) will produce greater tax savings for the party financing the
transaction than for the actual user of the equipment. In the typical
arrangement, the manufacturer or dealer sells the equipment to a
leasing company or limited partnership composed of individual in-
vestors, thereby terminating its connection with the transaction, save
for its warranties and other contractual obligations under the manu-
facturing or sales agreement. The purchasing group pays part of the
sales price with its own resources and borrows the balance from a
financial institution, ordinarily without recourse, and then leases the
property on a net basis to the ultimate user, whose payments over the
life of the lease enable the lessor to service its obligations to the
lender. 17
15. Rev. Rul. 55-540 was issued to deal with "new and unique types of agreements con-
cerning the use of and disposition of equipment," devised by lessors who are "primarily inter-
ested in disposing of [their] wares to customers." But see Universal Drilling Co. v. United
States, 412 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. La. 1976) (Rev. Rul. 55-540 criteria applied to charter of barge
by owner).
16. Current accounting standards, however, may require the transaction to be reflected as
a liability on the lessee-user's balance sheet. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, State-
ment No. 13, Accounting for Leases (1976).
17. For a more detailed description, see Fritch & Reisman, supra note 7. See generally
Goldstein, Equipment Leasing After the 1969 Act, 29 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1589 (1971);
Lukens, Tax Treatment of the Lease With Option to Purchase.- Is Allocation the Answer?, 11
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So far as the underlying business bargain is concerned (as dis-
tinguished from its documentation and labels), such a "leveraged" or
"financial" lease (so-called to distinguish it from an "operating"
lease) resembles a sale financed by first and second mortgages. For
tax purposes, however, the lessor must stay on the "lease" side of the
lease/sale boundary in order to get the tax allowances that, with the
agreement of the user, it expects to enjoy. As compensation for relin-
quishing these tax allowances to the lessor, the lessee obtains better
financial terms than would be available if the transaction was
financed by a conventional mortgage loan. In effect, the parties allo-
cate the tax allowances inherent in ownership of the property to the
party who will save the most by claiming them, and they then split
the resulting tax savings between themselves. Since the pie will be
largest if the tax allowances are shifted to individuals subject to the
highest personal tax rate, it is not surprising that neurosurgeons and
rock music stars become the owner-lessors of computers, jet air-
planes, and other costly business equipment.
In a seminal case involving a three-party equipment leasing ar-
rangement (which the IRS argued was tantamount to a conditional
sale by the purported lessor to the lessee), the Tax Court rejected the
taxpayer's contention that "financial" leases should be judged by dif-
ferent criteria than "operating" leases:
At the outset, we direct our attention to petitioner's argument
which stresses that the contracts are "financial leases" and not
"operating leases." The argument continues that financial leases
are a relatively new phenomenon in the business world and thus
should be judged in light of current hybrid financing and rental
techniques and not evaluated under the criteria outlined in Rev.
Rul. 55-540 or the earlier court cases which make no such distinc-
tion. We are not persuaded by this argument and feel constrained
to point out that there have been no provisions made in tax law
for special consideration to be given to hybrid leases which tend to
place the residual rights of the rented property in someone other
than the lessor. In the tax realm, such contracts are either leases or
they are not, and we make that determination based on tests enun-
ciated in our prior decisions.18
TAx L. REV. 65 (1955); Zeitlin, Tax Planning in Equipment-Leasing Shelters, 1969 So. CAL.
TAX INsT. 621.
18. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836 (1972), afdper curiam,
500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974). Northwest involved the purchase by a sales finance company of
leases between dealers in heavy equipment and their customers. Although the taxpayer lost the
first skirmish, when the court held that financial leases are subject to the same criteria as
operating leases, the taxpayer went on to win the battle (described by the Tax Court as "ex-
tremely close"), since the court found that the arrangement met normal "lease" standards. Id
at 844-45. In so holding, the Tax Court relied heavily on its earlier decision in Lockhart Leas-
ing Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 301 (1970). 58 T.C. at 845-49. However, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit, in affirming Lockhart Leasing, expressed the view that Rev. Rul.
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Although it applies Rev. Rul. 55-540 to leveraged leases, in 1975
the IRS announced a set of special guidelines applicable to taxpayers
requesting an advance ruling that a particular arrangement will be
treated as a lease for federal income tax purposes. To qualify for a
favorable ruling:
(a) the lessor must make and maintain a minimum uncondi-
tional "at risk" investment in the property of 20 percent of its cost;
(b) the lessee may not furnish any of the cost of the property; (c)
the lessee may not have a contractual right to purchase the prop-
erty from the lessor for less than its fair market value when the
right is exercised; (d) the lessor must establish that it expects to
realize a profit from the transaction, aside from the value of its tax
benefits; and (e) certain other conditions set out in the IRS an-
nouncement must be met. 19
On meeting these requirements, the taxpayers will ordinarily receive
a favorable ruling; but failure to satisfy the guidelines will not pre-
clude favorable rulings by the IRS "in appropriate cases on the basis
of all the facts and circumstances," nor are the standards intended to
describe the legal principles governing whether a transaction is or is
not a lease or to be used for audit purposes. 20
II. "TAX POLARITY"-REALLOCATION OF LUMP SUM SALES
PRICE AMONG INTERRELATED ASSETS
It is frequently necessary to allocate a lump sum sales price
among individual interrelated assets, so that the seller can compute
gain or loss separately for each item. The buyer must also determine
the cost of each item, in order to compute depreciation and gain or
loss on subsequent sales of the individual items. If the buyer and
seller bargain separately for each item,2' so that the aggregate
amount paid is merely the sum of the separate prices, like the total
on a supermarket cash register tape, it can be accurately allocated
back to its separate components. Even if the parties deal on an all-
or-nothing basis, an equally accurate allocation is feasible if the
package contains nothing but items with readily ascertainable indi-
vidual prices. But the process of allocating a lump sum among its
55-540 does not apply to taxpayers in the business of leasing property. See Lockhart Leasing
Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1971).
19. Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715; Rev. Proc. 75-78, 1975-1 C.B. 752. See also Rev.
Proc. 76-30, 1976-2 C.B. 647 (no-ruling policy if property is not expected to be useful at end of
lease's term except to the lessee); Javaras & Nelson, The New Leveraged Lease Guidelines, 53
TAXES 388 (1975). For an earlier ruling in this area, see Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87 (ship
financing arrangement treated as sale).
20. Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715, at § 3.
21. For the use of sealed bids to establish separate arm's-length prices for assets that
would normally be sold in tandem by simulating an auction market, see Marx v. Commis-
sioner, 29 T.C. 88 (1957) (sealed bids required by Groucho Marx to distinguish compensation
for personal services from payment for literary properties).
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components turns from an exact science to a vague art, or even to
guesswork, if the transferred property consists of a going business
whose constituent items are difficult to value and would not have
been sold in isolation, such as real estate, specialized equipment,
good will, covenants not to compete, patents, industrial know-how,
and franchises. 2
2
Knowing that they both will have to allocate the aggregate
amount paid among the separate assets for tax purposes, the buyer
and seller may seek to avoid arguments with the IRS in the future by
agreeing on an allocation at the time of the sale. Such an allocation
may have some nontax consequences; for example, it may affect the
damages to be paid if a particular asset is misrepresented or if the
seller breaches his covenant not to compete. Nontax consequences of
this type help to establish the validity of the allocation unless they
are too speculative to deserve attention. But just as the parties to a
purported lease cannot prevent it from being restructured as a sale in
appropriate circumstances by showing that the transaction's form
will have some nontax consequences, 23 so an allocation of a lump
sum sales price does not become sacrosanct simply because it may
affect the nontax rights of the parties.
It is sometimes asserted that the buyer and seller ordinarily have
opposing tax interests in allocating a lumpsum payment, so that self-
interest will evoke an accurate breakdown of the sales price among
the constituent items. A typical expression of this theory is: "The tax
avoidance desires of the buyer and seller in such a situation are ordi-
narily antithetical, forcing them, in most cases, to agree upon a treat-
ment which reflects the parties' true intent with reference to the
covenants, and the true value of them in money."'24
The enlightened self-interest posited by this "tax polarity" the-
ory can be illustrated by a simple example. Assume that a going
business is sold for $100,000, represented by merchandise with a fair
market value of $60,000 and goodwill with a fair market value of
$40,000; that both classes of assets have a zero basis in the seller's
hands; and that the seller is subject to a tax rate of 50% on merchan-
dise profits but that gain on the goodwill qualifies for a long-term
22. See generally Beghe, Income Tax Treatment of Covenants Not To Compete, Consulting
Agreements and Transfers of Goodwill, 30 TAx LAW. 587 (1977); Stansbury, Advising Clients on
Tax Treatment of Goodwill v. Covenant-Not-To-Compete Issue, 45 J. TAx. 208 (1976).
23. See text accompanying notes 8-20 supra.
24. Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1959) (allocation of lump sum
amount between stock and covenant not to compete). See also Balthrope v. Commissioner, 356
F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1966) (tax polarity is "a solid barrier to unrealistic allocations"); Treas.
Regs. § 1.1245-1 (a)(5): "In general, if a buyer and seller have adverse interests as to the alloca-
tion of the. amount realized [on a sale of two or more assets] between the section 1245 property
and the nonsection 1245 property, any arm's-length agreement between the buyer and the
seller will establish the allocation."
HeinOnline -- 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 724 1978
Restructuring Business Transactions
capital gain rate of 25%. If the $100,000 sales price is allocated by the
parties in accordance with the fair market value of the assets, the
seller's tax will aggregate $40,000, as shown by Table 1.
TABLE 1
TAX RESULT TO SELLER-ALLOCATION BASED ON FAIR MARKET
VALUES
Alloca-
Asset tion Basis Gain Tax Rate Tax
Merchan-
dise $ 60,000 $ 0 $ 60,000 50% $30,000
Goodwill $ 40,000 $ 0 $ 40,000 25% $10,000
Totals $100,000 $ 0 $100,000 $40,000
Assuming that the buyer is able in the following year to sell the
merchandise for $80,000 and the goodwill for $60,000, and that he is
also subject to a 50% rate on merchandise profits and to a 25% rate
on selling the goodwill, the buyer's aggregate tax liability will be
$15,000, as shown by Table 2.
TABLE 2
TAX RESULT TO BUYER ON SUBSEQUENT SALE-ALLOCATION
BASED ON FAIR MARKET VALUES
Proceeds of
Asset Sale Basis Gain Tax Rate Tax
Merchan-
dise $ 80,000 $ 60,000 $20,000 50% $10,000
Good-will $ 60,000 $ 40,000 $20,000 25% $ 5,000
Totals $140,000 $100,000 $40,000 $15,000
If the parties do not allocate the sales price of $100,000 in pro-
portion to the respective fair market values of the merchandise and
goodwill, one of them will suffer a disadvantage. Table 3 illustrates
the adverse effect on the seller (and the favorable effect on the buyer)
of an excessive allocation ($80,000) to the merchandise, resulting in
an offsetting underallocation ($20,000) of the sales proceeds to the
goodwill.
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TABLE 3
TAX RESULTS TO SELLER AND BUYER-EXCESSIVE
TO MERCHANDISE





Asset Proceeds Basis Gain Rate Tax
Merchan-
dise $ 80,000 $ 0 $ 80,000 50% $40,000
Goodwill $ 20,000 $ 0 $ 20,000 25% $ 5,000
Totals $100,000 $ 0 $100,000 $45,000
B. Result to Buyer on Subsequent Sale
Proceeds Tax
Asset of Sale Basis Gain Rate Tax
Merchan-
dise $ 80,000 $ 80,000 $ 0 50% $ 0
Goodwill $ 60,000 $ 20,000 $40,000 25% $10,000
Totals $140,000 $100,000 $40,000 $10,000
Table 4 demonstrates the converse of Table 3-the favorable
effect on the seller (and the adverse effect on the buyer) of an under-
allocation to merchandise ($40,000), coupled with a corresponding
overallocation ($60,000) to the goodwill.
TABLE 4
TAX RESULTS TO SELLER AND BUYER-EXCESSIVE ALLOCATION
TO GOODWILL




Asset Proceeds Basis Gain Rate Tax
Merchan-
dise $ 40,000 $ 0 $ 40,000 50% $20,000
Goodwill $ 60,000 $ 0 $ 60,000 25% $15,000
Totals $100,000 $ 0 $100,000 $35,000
726
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B. Result to Buyer on Subsequent Sale
Proceeds Tax
Asset of Sale Basis Gain Rate Tax
Merchan-
dise $ 80,000 $ 40,000 $40,000 50% $20,000
Goodwill $ 60,000 $ 60,000 $ 0 25% $ 0
Totals $140,000 $100,000 $40,000 $20,000
Although Tables 1-4 demonstrate that an arbitrary allocation of
the agreed $100,000 sales price will adversely affect one party at the
expense of the other, when compared with an allocation correspond-
ing to the fair market values of the assets, it does not follow that the
parties will always select the true-value allocation. Since the aggre-
gate amount of taxes to be paid by the seller and buyer is the same
($55,000) regardless of the allocation, they may well want to bargain
about the division of this burden between them. Assuming that the
true values of the assets are sufficiently debatable so that any of the
three allocations can be supported by satisfactory evidence, there is
no more reason for them to select the allocation reflected by Tables 1
and 2 than the allocations shown in Table 3 or Table 4. Moreover, if
they know in advance that the courts will accept whatever allocation
they adopt because of their alleged "tax polarity," the allocation they
chose will depend on their respective bargaining power, not on the
fair market values of the assets.
Finally, there is a reciprocal relationship between the sales price
(assumed in the example to be $100,000), and its allocation between
the assets; and this means that the parties can alter both the sales
price and the allocation, without affecting the aggregate tax burden
or their after-tax positions. Thus, reducing the sales price from
$100,000 to $95,000 will produce the same after-tax results as Tables
I and 2, if the reduced sales price is allocated for tax purposes be-
tween merchandise and goodwill in the proportion 45/50. Con-
versely, increasing the sales price to $105,000 will also produce the
same after-tax results as Table 1 if the merchandise is valued at
$75,000 and the goodwill at $30,000.25
25. The following is a mathematical demonstration of this point.
Let x = amount allocated to goodwill.
y = amount allocated to merchandise.
Assuming the seller has a zero basis for both the assets, his tax is (l/2)y + (I/4)x. His
after-tax receipts are thus x + y - tax, or x + y -(l/2)y+(l/4)x, which will be set equal to 60,
his receipts (in thousands of dollars) under the initial arrangement.
The buyer's bases will be y and x on the merchandise and goodwill, respectively. His
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The example used for Tables 1-4 assumes that the buyer and
seller are subject to the same marginal tax rates and does not take
account of differences in the taxable years when the income attribu-
table to the transaction will be reported. If we posit divergent tax
rates for buyer and seller and/or timing differences between them,
their allocation of a lump sum sales price cannot only shift the tax
burden from one party to the other, but also-if accepted by the
IRS-alter their aggregate tax burden.
This possibility can be illustrated by varying the example and
assuming that the buyer is a tax-exempt institution, which does not
care how the aggregate amount to be paid is allocated among the
constituent items. On this assumption, the seller's tax liability can be
reduced from $40,000 (Table 1) to $35,000 (Table 4) by a 40/60 allo-
cation of the $100,000 sales price to the merchandise and goodwill,
respectively-and this reduction in the seller's tax will cost the tax-
exempt buyer nothing. Generated at the expense of the Treasury,
which is absent from the bargaining table, this tax savings can be
shared by the seller with the buyer in the form of a reduced sales
price. In short,,instead of allocating an agreed sales price in propor-
tion to the values of the assets being sold, tax-conscious parties can
sometimes minimize the aggregate tax liability so that the antici-
pated tax savings becomes an element in determining the sales price.
The simplified example used to illustrate this phenomenon
posits, for convenience, a tax-exempt buyer; but similar possibilities
after-tax receipts, assuming a later sale of the business for 140, are: 140 - (x + y) - (1/2 (80 -
y) - 1/4 (60 - x)). This quantity is set equal to 25, again in accordance with the initial ar-
rangement.
The two resulting equations each simplify to give 2y + 3x = 240. Avoiding the complica-
tions that would be introduced by losses on any of the sales, x can go as high as 60, and y
can go as high as 80, the amounts for which these assets are resold by the buyer in the later
year.
Within these limits, any values of x and y which satisfy the above equation will leave the
positions of the parties unchanged. The total sales price will vary between 90 and 106 2/3,
while the actual allocation between goodwill and merchandise will vary tremendously. (If
losses were allowed, even greater variability in the total sales price could take place.) The
following values are representative:
Allocated Allocated
Total to to Profits
Sales Merchan- Goodwill Seller's B er's
Price dise (y) (x) Tax Tax Seller Buyer
90 30 60 30 25 60 25
95 45 50 35 20 60 25
100 60 40 40 15 60 25
105 75 30 45 10 60 25
106 2/3 80 26 2/3 46 2/3 8 1/3 60 25
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exist whenever the private parties are in different tax brackets, will
recognize the income and deductions attributable to the transaction
in different years, or have other divergent tax attributes (e.g., loss
carryovers). 26 Thus, the clash of enlightened self-interest will not
necessarily produce an allocation corresponding to fair market val-
ues.
The possibility that one party to a business bargain will gain
more from an arbitrary allocation of an agreed amount than the
other will lose has not gone unnoticed by the courts. An example is
the following description by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit of the sale of a winery and its merchandise inventory by a seller
wishing to maximize the long-term capital gain component of his
profit:
Tiara [the buyer] informed petitioner [the seller] that it did
not care how he allocated the purchase price so long as the total
price did not exceed the agreed $350,000. Petitioner had been ad-
vised by his accountant that the sale of his winery would result in
a capital gains tax whereas [gain on] the wine would be subject to
ordinary income tax. The tax consequence of assigning a high val-
uation to the winery and a low valuation to the wine inventory
was undoubtedly understood by petitioner. He therefore drew up
the contract specifying separate prices for the wine and winery to
suit his own convenience. The price allocated to the wine in the
contract certainly did not represent the true value or the value
contemplated by both parties and bears no resemblance to the re-
alities of the transaction. The total purchase price was arrived at
through arms length negotiation but the allocation of the selling
price to the two pieces of property involved was not. Once the
parties had agreed upon the purchase price it was a matter of
indifference to the buyer to how the seller allocated it. The argu-
ment that the valuation placed on the wine and winery was of
vital importance to Tiara because it necessarily affected its income
tax position has no merit. That argument wholly ignores the cru-
cial fact that the federal income tax is a graduated tax and a given
transaction may have different consequences depending upon the
circumstances of the particular taxpayer.
27
26. There are other situations in which the parties are not hostile. For example, in allocat-
ing an agreed amount among a group of depreciable assets, the buyer ordinarily would prefer
a high valuation for short-lived assets and a low valuation for long-lived assets, since this will
accelerate his depreciation deductions. Since gain on both classes of depreciable assets is ordi-
narily taxed as capital gain under I.R.C. § 1231, the seller may not care how the aggregate
amount is allocated among them. A corporation concerned about preserving a good earnings
record may be willing, on purchasing a going business, to accept a low value for inventory,
which will inflate its subsequent earnings, despite the increased tax liability. If the allocation
results in a higher value for the goodwill, earnings for financial reporting purposes will be
reduced by amortization, but only over a 40-year period. For the accounting treatment of
goodwill, see A.P.B. Ops. Nos. 16, 17 (as amended).
27. Particelli v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1954). See also Lemery v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367, 376 (1969), afl'dper curiam, 451 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1971) (seller of
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Occasionally an allocation is fictitious to the point of fraud, as
illustrated by the following anecdote by Randolph Paul:
It is easy to give illustrations of prevailing techniques of mis-
representation. One favorite device is to put a transaction into two
contracts, one of which is to be shown to the Government's repre-
sentatives, and the other of which is to be kept secret. This hap-
pened once in my experience in connection with a sale of stock to
a buyer for about $5 million. Since the buyer had an option on the
stock of about $3 million, it was obvious that $2 million was being
paid for an agreement not to compete. A payment for this cove-
nant would have been ordinary income and not capital gain. The
seller insisted that this transaction be put in two documents, one of
which would recite the sale of stock for $5 million, and the other
of which would provide against competition without mentioning
any consideration. I felt obliged to refuse to be an adviser in this
transaction. As a result, my client, who had reluctantly agreed be-
cause of anxiety to procure the stock, went to another attorney
who was willing to let the client do what the seller wished. The
client never came to me with his subsequent problems.
28
If the allocation has significant nontax consequences they
should, of course, count in its favor, and within limits, so should the
opposing tax interests of the parties, if they have not ganged up on
the IRS. On the other hand, it should occasion no surprise that
agreed allocations of lump-sum payments are often subjected to ad-
ministrative and judicial scrutiny, rather than accepted at face value.
III. ROLE OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The parol evidence rule is only a shadow of its former self in the
contemporary law of contracts, 29 but it is frequently imported into
the tax area by taxpayers hoping to bar the restructuring of a trans-
action or by the IRS as a defense against a taxpayer's effort to escape
from the language of a written agreement. Although these attempts
to exclude parol evidence are almost invariably unsuccessful, they
recur with such regularity as to justify a more fundamental examina-
tion of the parol evidence rule's function than is ordinarily to be
found in the tax decisions. As summarized by Corbin, the rule is as
follows:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it
in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete and
stock with covenant not to compete did not care how purchase price was allocated because
stock had been held for less than 6 months and tax liability would be the same whether profit
was taxed as ordinary income or as short-term capital gain).
28. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 412, 421 (1953).
29. See CALAMARI & PARILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 97-131 (2d ed. 1977); J. MUR-
PAY, CONTRACTS § 225 (2d rev. ed. 1974); Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence. Diagno-
sis and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L.Q. 1036 (1968).
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accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or
otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not
be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writ-
ing.
30
The parol evidence rule has been described as a legal concept
"whose mysteries are familiar to many but fathomed by few," 3 but
it is quite obvious that written agreements are rarely, if ever, restruc-
tured for federal tax purposes in order to reinstate a prior inconsis-
tent understanding between the parties. Indeed, many transactions
are restructured even though there was no prior understanding be-
tween the parties. Under Rev. Rul. 55-540, for example, a purported
lease is viewed as a sale if its terms satisfy certain conditions, all of
which look to the agreement as written rather than to any prior nego-
tiations or understandings between the parties.
32
This is not to suggest that prior discussions are irrelevant in de-
termining whether an agreement should be restructured. To the con-
trary, if, for example, a purported lease with an option to purchase
was preceded by an oral offer to purchase or sell the property, the
price bid or asked can help to establish whether "the total of the
rental payments and any option price payable in addition thereto
approximates the price at which the equipment could have been ac-
quired by purchase at the time of entering the agreement, plus inter-
est and/or carrying charges," which under Rev. Rul. 55-540
generally denotes a sale.3 3 The unaccepted offer to purchase or sell
the property is evidence-indeed, it may be the best evidence--of
the equipment's normal sale price; but since the evidence is not used
to vary or contradict the obligations of the parties under subsequent
written agreement in any way, the parol evidence rule is not contra-
vened.
34
The relationship of the parol evidence rule to attempts to
restructure business transactions should be distinguished from other
situations in which it is more pertinent. When the federal income tax
consequences of a transaction turn on a taxpayer's rights and duties
under a written contract whose meaning is disputed, the taxpayer or
the IRS may offer evidence of prior negotiations or understandings
between the parties in order to clarify or alter the meaning of the
contract or to establish that it was not intended to be enforced. Since
what is ordinarily at stake in these cases is the legal effect of the
agreement under state law, the proffered evidence is relevant only if
30. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (1960). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7) § 239 (1973); 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 631 (3d ed. 1961).
31. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 226.
32. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39.
33. Id. § 4.05.
34. See Taft v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 808 (1933) (unequivocal offer to purchase prop-
erty used to determine substance of transaction; purported lease treated as sale).
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it affects the rights and duties of the parties. Thus, it is necessary to
determine whether the parol evidence rule (which, despite its label, is
a rule of substantive law rather than a rule of evidence) would,
under the law of the appropriate state, permit or bar this use of the
pre-agreement discussions.
35
It is sometimes suggested that the IRS, being "a stranger to the
contract, ' 36 is not bound by, and cannot invoke, the parol evidence
rule. Neither of these notions is well-founded if the issue to be de-
cided is the legal effect of the written agreement on the private par-
ties who executed it. In this situation, the IRS should have the same
power that the parties have to resort to their prior understandings to
clarify the scope or meaning of the agreement as executed. In this
connection, it should be noted that the contemporary trend in the
law of contracts, which may or may not prevail in any given state, is
to enlarge these sources of enlightenment rather than restrict them.37
IV. ATTEMPTS BY TAXPAYERS TO RESTRUCTURE TRANSACTIONS
If the IRS is content to accept a transaction at face value, can
one of the parties take the initiative and demand that it be restruc-
tured to conform to economic reality? The courts have vacillated be-
tween allowing taxpayers to invoke the substance-over-form doctrine
as freely as the IRS and letting them stew in their own juices if that
appeals to the government's appetite. On the whole, however, the
courts tend to apply the two-way street approach when taxpayers
endeavor to restructure a transaction to conform to its substance.
This tolerance may reflect a judicial feeling that the issue in
most restructuring cases is the legal category to which the transaction
belongs; that its classification should not depend on the labels used
by the parties, even if they were deliberately chosen for their emotive
affect; and that the words of the contract are not a representation of
facts (giving rise to an estoppel), but only a reflection of an opinion
about the transaction's legal status (which should not induce reliance
by the IRS). In at least one area-attempts by a taxpayer to establish
that a sale-and-leaseback or similar transaction was tantamount to a
mortgage-there is a long common law tradition, rooted in prohibi-
tions on usury, allowing borrowers to disavow the form of an agree-
35. For an excellent discussion, see Estate of Craft v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 249, 268
(1977) (Simpson, J., concurring) (distinguishing situations in which a tax provision turns on
actual behavior rather than on the extent of the taxpayer's rights under state law). See also
Clark v. United States, 341 F,2d 691 (9th Cir. 1965) (taxpayer not allowed to introduce parol
evidence to contradict integrated contract, where tax results depended on its legal effect). For
other illustrations of the problem, which are less thoroughly analyzed, see Sullivan v. United
States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 905 (1967) (effect of stock purchase
agreement).
36. See, e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966).
37. See note 29 supra.
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ment, even if deliberately chosen.38 Although it might be argued that
revenue agents should be allowed to rely on the labels chosen by
taxpayers in order to expedite tax administration, the principal IRS
rulings in the restructured transaction area establish standards that
can evidently be invoked by taxpayers to establish that a purported
lease is a sale.39 While delay and inefficiency may result from al-
lowing taxpayers to repudiate the form in which they chose to cloak
a transaction, these rulings imply that the administrative cost is not
excessive.
A burgeoning exception to these principles, however, has devel-
oped with respect to agreed allocations of the sales price in contracts
for the sale of a going business or the stock of an incorporated enter-
prise, when accompanied by a covenant not to compete. If the IRS
chooses to hold the parties to the allocation, it is ordinarily allowed
to do so unless the taxpayer establishes that the allocation is fictitious
by greater proof than is required in ordinary tax cases. As usually
formulated, this heavier burden entails "strong proof" by the tax-
payer,4° but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has escalated
the standard to the level required to vary the terms of a written con-
tract under common law-proof that the allocation was induced by
mistake, fraud, duress, or undue influence.
4'
Under this acting criterion, a party who was not represented by
counsel can escape from an agreed allocation if it was represented as
a formal recital having no legal effect on him; but in virtually all
other circumstances, the allocation would be binding if the IRS
elected to hold the taxpayer to it.42 To justify imposing an abnormal
burden of proof on taxpayers seeking to disavow an allocation, these
decisions argue that the agreement should ordinarily be controlling
for a number of reasons: the "tax polarity" of the parties; the possi-
bility of denying a bargained-for tax advantage to the taxpayer's op-
posite number; the administrative burden imposed on the IRS,
38. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1291 (1978); Helvering v. F. & R.
Lazurus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
39. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39.
40. Montesi v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1965); Ullman v. Commissioner, 264
F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959).
41. Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967).
See also Dakan v. United States, 492 F.2d 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Koff, Judicial Treatment of
Covenants Not to Compete.- The Third Circuit Takes a Giant Step, 24 TAx L. REv. 513 (1969).
In Freeport Transport, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 107 (1974), the court refused to
apply Danielson to a case appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, where both
parties were before the Tax Court, because "[tlo do so would produce a wholly incompatible
result in two related cases, consolidated on motion by the respondent, for the sole purpose of
protecting the revenues." Id at 115.
42. See Proulx v. United States, 40 A.F.T.R.2d 6168 (Ct. Cl. 1977), where a trial judge of
the Court of Claims found that a covenant not to compete had "no significant economic real-
ity" but that the amount allocated thereto by the parties could not be disregarded under the
Danielson rule.
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which may have to litigate with both taxpayers and may be whip-
sawed by inconsistent decisions; and the difficulty of placing separate
values on items that would not have been sold in isolation.43 All of
these factors deserve some weight; however, except for the last point,
they are not unique to allocation cases, but can be encountered
whenever a taxpayer seeks to restructure a two-party transaction.
But in ordinary restructuring cases, the customary burden of proof
that taxpayers must bear when suing to set aside a deficiency or get a
refund has evidently been adequate.
Sometimes the parties to an agreed allocation buttress it with an
explicit agreement to use the same figures in reporting the transac-
tion to the IRS. On violating an implicit commitment to this effect, a
buyer was held liable for the legal fees incurred by the seller in suc-
cessfully defending itself in a resulting tax case.44 If the allocation
43. See Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967) (unjust enrichment to
the taxpayer, since the sales price may take into account the anticipated tax results of the
allocation; administrative burden; and possible whip-saw of IRS); Ullman v. Commissioner,
264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959) ("antithetical" tax interests of buyer and seller tend to induce
allocations base on "true value"). In UMCO Corp. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. 1009 (CCH)
(1973), the Tax Court treated the strong proof rule as a corollary of the "tax polarity" thought
to be typical of transactions involving goodwill and covenants not to compete, observing:
"Whether such a rule would be applied in situations other than the covenant not to compete-
goodwill allocation cases where conflicting tax interests exist need not be decided here, for in
this case there is no showing of any such tax conflict." Id at 1011.
On the extent to which taxpayers' efforts to control the tax results of a transaction should
be controlling, see Bennett v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 381 (1972):
Respondent [the IRS] also urges that Jones [the other contracting party] would not
have assented to the transaction if petitioner [the taxpayer] had not agreed to allow it to
take the form of a purchase of the stock from him and, on this ground, insists that we
are precluded from holding that the arrangement was a redemption from Jones. How-
ever, in any transaction where the form differs from the substance, such difference is
presumably dictated by someone who has the power to change the natural form of the
transaction. The fact that the one causing such a change has the power to prevent the
transaction from occurring in any other way is not sufficient, in itself, to show that the
form chosen reflects the substance of the transaction.
Id at 389.
See also Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947) (superfluous contractual provisions
do not affect determination of "employee" status for purposes of employment tax and hence
cannot shift tax liability from one entity to another); Robinson v. Elliot, 262 F.2d 383, 385 (9th
Cir. 1958) (lease with option to purchase held to be a sale, as contended by seller; as to impact
of this decision on the lessee-purchaser, when such a party hopes to save taxes, he "will just
have to take a gamble that his legal format will stick").
For concern with the administrative burden on the IRS, see Leisure Dynamics, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 494 F.2d 1340, 1347 (8th Cir. 1974) (Stuart, J., dissenting).
For stress on valuation difficulties, see Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir.
1961) ("impossible task of assigning fair values to goodwill and to covenants"); Amerada Hess
Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975) ("only the
parties to [a covenant not to compete] could value it; there exists no outside valuation index").
44. Stem & Co. v. State Loan & Fin. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1965) (applying
Pennsylvania law). See also Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 280 N.Y.S.2d
679 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), a''d per curiam, 21 N.Y.2d 916, 289 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1968) (damage
award for giving misleading information to IRS reversed for insufficient evidence); Problems in
Acquiring a Business. A Panel Discussion, 26 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 815, 822 (1968); Note,
Tax Consequences of Asset Valuations in Arm's Length Agreements Between Unrelated Parties,
27 TAx L. REv. 145, 146-47 (1971).
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had been set aside in the tax case, however, holding the buyer liable
for the seller's legal expenses would have smacked of a penalty for
properly reporting the transaction. Moreover, a contract designed to
discourage a taxpayer from reporting a transaction in accordance
with his best judgment when the return is filed, even if it turns out to
be wrong, might be viewed as contrary to public policy.
V. CONSISTENCY IN RESTRUCTURING Two-PARTY
TRANSACTIONS
In theory, when a two-party transaction is restructured or an
agreed amount is reallocated in accordance with the principles dis-
cussed above, the new characterization should apply to both parties,
and the IRS ordinarily endeavors to achieve this objective. For ex-
ample, if a seller disputes the validity of an agreed allocation, the
IRS usually assesses deficiencies against both parties, 45 while ac-
knowledging that only one deficiency should be ultimately upheld.
46
This tactic resembles an interpleader action, except that the IRS is
not an indifferent stakeholder of a fixed amount, since the opposing
tax burdens of the private parties will almost never be identical.
Moreover, unless the dispute is purely factual, the potential prece-
dential weight of the cases ordinarily leads the IRS to prefer one
outcome over the other.
The IRS has no formal administrative tools to compel consis-
tency of treatment, since the two cases, if litigated, may eventually be
decided by different appellate courts. For this reason, the IRS may
win, or lose, both cases. If it wins the first to be litigated, however,
inconsistency can be avoided by a government concession in the
other case. The prospect of consistency is enhanced if the cases are
consolidated in the Tax Court, since any issues of fact are likely to be
45. If the IRS neglects to move promptly, and the first taxpayer eventually wins, the stat-
ute of limitations may bar an action against the second contracting party. I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314,
mitigating the effect of the statute of limitations, do not treat buyers and sellers as "related
taxpayers." These mitigation provisions do apply, however, with respect to all tax years of each
party separately; thus, if the seller is able to escape from an agreed allocation, deficiencies, if
appropriate, can be assessed for all earlier years, not merely for "open" years, in order to
insure consistency. See generally Coleman, Mitigation of the Statute of Limitations--Sections
1311-15, 31 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1575 (1973); Note, Sections 1311-15 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.- Some Problems in Administration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1536 (1959).
46. See Dixie Fin. Co. v. United States, 474 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1973), where the govern-
ment won both cases at the trial level (one in the Tax Court and the other in a federal district
court), but announced that if one decision was affirmed, it would accept a reversal of the other.
See also Goodall v. Commissioner, 391 F.2d 775 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968)
(inconsistent deficiencies not improper, where ultimate consistent treatment of alternate tax-
payers is intended and determination is not frivolous); Goldstein v. United States, 227 F.2d 1,
5 (8th Cir. 1955) (quoting IRS commitment to treat other parties consistently with result in
litigated case); Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cit. 1957); Wilshire Holding
Corp. v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1957).
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resolved in the same way for both parties.47 Unfortunately, harmony
is not guaranteed even in this situation. Each taxpayer has the bur-
den of proof in his own case, and one might fail to convince the
judge that a witness is telling the truth, while the other simultane-
ously fails to prove by the requisite standard that the same witness is
mistaken.48 The prospect of inconsistent findings at the trial level is
increased if one case is tried in the Tax Court and the other in a
federal district court.49 Because of the current lack of enforceable
safeguards against inconsistent treatment of either the IRS or related
parties, legislative measures against "whip-saw" have been actively
discussed 'in recent years.5 0 Much can be said for procedural rules
that, while continuing to permit transactions to be restructured in
accordance with their substance, would increase the likelihood of
consistent treatment of the same transaction by the IRS and all pri-
vate parties thereto.
VI. CONCLUSION
Parties entering into a business transaction are generally free to
structure the transaction in any way that they see fit. For federal tax
purposes, however, the IRS and the courts have a long history of
restructuring business transactions to reflect economic reality. Sales
that are disguised as leases and lump-sum sale prices misallocated
among interrelated assets are prime candidates for restructuring.
While a taxpayer may seek to restructure a business transaction in
order to receive more favorable tax treatment, in some courts at
least, the taxpayer must meet a heavy burden of proof. The parol
evidence rule is often invoked by taxpayers facing reallocation, but
the rule is only relevant when the IRS seeks to alter the terms of the
transaction by proof of a prior oral agreement. It is not available
when the only issue is how a transaction, the terms of which are not
in dispute, should be characterized.
47. See, e.g., Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961) (consolidated cases
tried in Tax Court and appealed to same appellate court).
48. For discussion of the burden of proof in consolidated cases, see Freeport Transp., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 107 (1974). See also Drummond v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 243,
249 (CCH) (1976) ("[b]oth parties have the burden of proving that respondent's determination
is erroneous, and respondent's position as stakeholder does not alter this rule" (footnote omit-
ted)).
49. See Dixie Fin. Co. v. United States, 474 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1973).
50. See 4B,4 Tax Section, Final Report of Special Committee on Whpsaw, 30 TAx LAW.
127 (1976); Lake, The Whipsaw Problem in Federal Tax Controversies, 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED.
TAX. 867 (1976). For a general survey, see Plumb, The Problem ofRelated Taxpayers."A Proce-
dural Study, 66 HARV. L. REV. 225 (1952).
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